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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE TARGETING OF NON-STATE 
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND OBJECTS 
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT* 
This Article examines the targetability of individuals and organizations 
performing intelligence functions for a non-State group involved in an armed 
conflict. Specifically, it considers the circumstances under which they lose 
the international humanitarian law (IHL) protections from, and during, 
attacks that they would otherwise enjoy as civilians. To do so, the piece 
deconstructs IHL’s “organized armed group” construct to determine when 
an intelligence organization can be characterized as a component thereof. 
Noting that some non-State groups consist of both entities involved in the 
hostilities and organizations having no relationship to them, the Article 
introduces the concept of a non-State group’s “overall OAG,” a notion that 
parallel’s the characterization of a State’s various military units as its 
“armed forces.” Additionally, the Article assesses the circumstances under 
which individuals engaged in activities intelligence who are not members of 
an OAG may be targeted on the basis of their “direct participation in the 
hostilities.”  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The essence of warfare is the “attack,” defined in international 
humanitarian law (IHL) as an “act[] of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence.”1 Civilians and specially-protected military 
personnel enjoy key legal protections from attack.2 However, as will be 
explained, civilians who are members of an “organized armed group” 
(OAG)3 or otherwise “directly participate in hostilities”4 forfeit that 
protection and therefore are not only subject to lawful attack, but need not 
be considered when assessing the proportionality of an attack5 and the 
requirement to take precautions during the attack to avoid harm to civilians 
and civilian objects.6 
These textually straightforward rules have proven difficult to interpret 
and apply in practice. Indeed, a five-year project of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to examine these rules ended in failure 
 
 1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Acts of violence against civilians self-evidently also 
qualify as attacks since treaty and customary law prohibit “attacking” civilians, except in the 
circumstances set forth in this article. Id. art. 51(2) (in international armed conflict); Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol II] (in non-international armed conflict); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], 
1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY r.1 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. Some States, including the United States and Israel, are 
not Parties to the Additional Protocols and accordingly not bound by their provisions. However, in most 
cases, the provisions cited in this article reflect customary international law and as such bind non-Parties. 
For an unofficial, but generally reliable, catalogue of those provisions the United States considers as 
reflecting customary law, see Matthew J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of 
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. 
UNIV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987). See also the ICRC’s comprehensive study on the topic, CIHL, 
supra, which lays out the basis for concluding certain IHL rules are customary. 
 2.  Specially protected military personnel include, inter alia, medical and religious personnel and 
those who are hors de combat.  See CIHL, supra note 2, rr. 25, 27, 47, and treaty provisions cited in the 
commentary thereto. See also OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T DEF., LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL §§ 5.9, 7.8.2 (2015, updated 2016) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL]. 
 3. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 31-31 (May 2009) 
[hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
 4. On “direct participation,” see Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol 
II, supra note 2, art. 13(2); DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 5.8.2.1, 5.8.3; CIHL, supra note 2, r. 6. 
 5. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); CIHL, supra note 2, 
r. 14; DOD MANUAL, supra 3, § 5.10. 
 6. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a) & (3); CIHL, supra note 2, r5. 15-17, 20-21; 
DOD MANUAL, supra 3, § 5.11. 
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when the distinguished group of experts could not agree on key issues. 
Accordingly, the organization published the resulting Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation as its in-house position, rather than a 
consensus view of the experts, which was the original objective.7 
This Article examines one critical facet of the matter: the targetability 
of individuals and groups performing intelligence functions for a non-State 
group involved in an armed conflict. It does not address other matters that 
are determined by the legal status of individuals under IHL, such as detention 
and combatant immunity.8 Rather, analysis is limited to the question of when 
individuals who are members of organizations involved in intelligence 
activities that benefit a non-State group, or who engage in such activities on 
their own, lose the protection from attack they would otherwise be entitled 
to under IHL.9  While that question surfaces primarily in the context of non-
international armed conflicts to which non-State groups are party, which is 
the focus of the following discussion, non-State groups and individuals are 
also sometimes active during international armed conflicts, thereby raising 
identical questions that are usually addressed in the same manner.10 
Since a common legal analysis applies to OAGs in both forms of 
conflict, the term “non-State party to the conflict” is employed broadly in 
this Article to denote any non-State group that is active in an international 
armed conflict or party to a non-international armed conflict. As will be 
explained, a non-State group may either itself be an OAG or be part of an 
OAG within a “mixed group.” The term “overall OAG” is used herein as 
encompassing all the fighting wings and supporting organizations of a mixed 
 
 7. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 4. On the Interpretive Guidance, see generally Dapo 
Akande, Clearing the Fog of War - The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 180 (2010). 
 8. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 11; DOD MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 9.3.2, 3.4.1.2. 
 9. “Conduct of hostilities” is an IHL term referring to fighting and other military activities 
associated with combat operations. 
 10. International armed conflicts are between States (or a State and an organized armed group under 
the overall control of a State), whereas non-international armed conflicts are between a State and an 
organized armed group or between organized armed groups. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-
72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). On “overall control,” see Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 120, 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See also 
Common Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which govern the material field of application 
of international and non-international armed conflict respectively. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 75 U.N.T.S. 
85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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non-State group. 
For the purposes of this article, the term “intelligence” refers to “[t]he 
product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or 
potential operations.”11 It also encompasses “counterintelligence,” except 
where a distinction between intelligence and counterintelligence is necessary 
for analytical purposes.12 Counterintelligence is designed to foil and impede 
the enemy’s intelligence operations. It involves both counterespionage 
activities, including countersurveillance, and security functions. The former 
are “designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage 
activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and 
repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected 
of conducting espionage activities.”13 “Security” functions by contrast, 
consist of “[m]easures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to 
protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its 
effectiveness,” such as “prevent[ing] unauthorized persons from having 
access to official information.”14 
Although the focus is on non-State “intelligence organizations” and 
“intelligence personnel,” terms that respectively denote groups and 
individuals with regular duties involving intelligence, other groups or 
individuals sometimes collect and disseminate operationally useful 
information. For example, a non-State fighter who engages in tactical 
questioning of a just-captured enemy soldier is not necessarily an 
intelligence operative as such but might nevertheless uncover information of 
intelligence value.15 Similarly, a sympathetic social or religious group that 
passes information to a non-State group’s OAG on a periodic basis is not an 
intelligence organization per se but, again, can prove a valuable intelligence 
asset for the armed group.16 Under certain circumstances, the individuals 
 
 11. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 107 (amended through Jan. 2020), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ 
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY]. 
 12. See, e.g., definition of “intelligence operations” in id. at 108. 
 13. Id. at 51. 
 14. Id. at 191. 
 15. “Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical 
value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols . . . .” DEP’T OF THE ARMY, 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.33, paras. 1–17 (Sept. 2006) 
[hereinafter FIELD MANUAL]. 
 16. For instance, ISIS set up Da’wah Offices that performed missionary type and social service 
function in areas in which the group wanted to operate. Those who attended the religious and social events 
were often persuaded to serve as informants “under the guise of promoting the righteousness of providing 
information that fosters the religion.” Carl Anthony Wege, The Changing Islamic State Intelligence 
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involved may be lawfully attacked by virtue of such activities even though 
they are not formally integrated into the OAG. Therefore, the scope of 
examination extends beyond intelligence organizations and personnel that 
are assigned intelligence duties as their core responsibility for an OAG. 
Part II begins with a brief survey of both the significance intelligence 
holds for non-State groups and the variety of organizational approaches they 
take to intelligence activities. Part III turns to the normative framework 
governing status issues that are relevant to non-State organizations and 
personnel and the consequences of status vis-à-vis targeting. In particular, it 
examines the legal framework for targeting individuals under IHL. 
With the groundwork established, Part IV focuses on OAGs in the 
intelligence context. It commences with an examination of the OAG 
construct to determine when an intelligence organization can be 
characterized as a component thereof. Sometimes a non-State group is 
composed of both an OAG and separate organizations having no relationship 
to the hostilities. This raises the question of where intelligence organizations 
fit within such “mixed groups,” the answer to which determines the 
circumstances allowing for attack on its personnel. The Article introduces an 
approach by which various entities of a non-State group, including 
intelligence organizations, comprise the group’s “overall OAG,” much as a 
State’s disparate military units make up the armed forces. Such entities may 
be considered ensemble as the OAG by virtue of common control over them 
and the function they perform. Complicating matters is the fact that some 
intelligence organizations are themselves comprised of military and non-
military departments; therefore, the discussion includes consideration of the 
circumstances in which the latter may be characterized as lying outside the 
non-State group’s OAG. 
Drilling further down into OAGs, it is necessary to determine when an 
individual is a member of an OAG and therefore subject to OAG targeting 
rules. The issue arises because membership is not always clear, since not all 
non-State OAGs have formal recruiting mechanisms or indicia signaling 
membership. The analysis of an individual’s status as a member of an OAG 
concludes by taking on the debate over whether all OAG members are 
targetable or only those who have a so-called “continuous combat function.” 
Part V deals with the targetability of individuals engaging in 
intelligence activities who are not OAG members. Such activities sometimes 
result in their loss of protected status “for so long” as they “directly 
participate in hostilities.” Direct participation in hostilities is a status 
 
Apparatus, 31 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 271, 274–75 (2018). 
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measured against three constitutive elements set forth by the ICRC17 that are 
generally accepted by the international law community, albeit with open 
disagreement on their application in specific circumstances.18 Discussion 
focuses on when an intelligence activity rises to the level of direct 
participation such that attacking the individual concerned is permissible. 
For the sake of completeness, the substantive discussion concludes in 
Part VI with a brief foray into the targetability of objects. Like civilians, 
civilian objects used for intelligence purposes sometimes lose their protected 
status. This may occur through use of the object for military purposes, 
probable future use for military purposes, or by virtue of the object’s 
location. De jure, targetability of an object does not depend on who uses it. 
However, as will be explained, objects used for military intelligence 
purposes, regardless of the status of the user, are likely to qualify as 
targetable military objectives. 
II. NON-STATE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION 
Intelligence operations have been a feature of organized warfare 
throughout history, for knowing the enemy’s capabilities, weaknesses, and 
intentions, while masking one’s own, affords a significant advantage on the 
battlefield. In particular, the party to a conflict that enjoys an advantage in 
this regard can often “operate inside” its opponent’s “OODA loop” by 
“observing, orienting, directing, and acting” more quickly.19 Thus, 
intelligence affords the operational initiative to the advantaged party, while 
rendering the other side largely reactive. 
This dynamic is pronounced with respect to non-State groups, for 
effective intelligence can offset operational and tactical disadvantages 
 
 17. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 46. 
 18. For instance, the International Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations “generally agreed with the three cumulative criteria.” 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 429 (Michael 
N. Schmitt ed., 2017). On the disagreement, see the articles compiled in the special edition of the New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics: Bill Boothby, ”And for Such Time As”: The 
Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Nils 
Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques 
of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); 
Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 
(2010). 
 19. On the OODA loop, see Michael T. Plehn, Control Warfare: Inside the OODA Loop (June 2000) 
(unpublished MPhil thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University), https://apps.dtic.mil/ 
sti/pdfs/ADA391774.pdf. 
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resulting from disparities in forces, weapons, technology, and funding. 
Indeed, non-State groups often have demonstrated an ability to mount 
complex operations against otherwise superior forces by relying on robust 
intelligence. In one well-known example, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan 
used the American David Headley to collect intelligence over a three-year 
period to enable the 2008 attacks against targets in Mumbai, India.20 Nearly 
170 persons died.21 In another the following year, al-Qaeda used a Jordanian 
triple agent to gather intelligence on, and gain access to, a Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) outpost at the organization’s forward operating 
base in Khost, Afghanistan. The ensuing attack killed seven CIA personnel.22 
Mission success against far stronger adversaries in these examples hinged on 
the related intelligence operations, as well as the OAGs’ ability to shield their 
intelligence activities from their opponents’ own collection efforts. 
Technology is enhancing the effectiveness of non-State intelligence 
organizations and personnel by allowing OAGs to leverage this dynamic. 
Advanced intelligence capabilities are increasingly accessible to such groups 
and can serve as powerful force multipliers. Examples include commercially 
available advanced space capabilities23; the growing affordability and 
increased portability of off-the-shelf remotely piloted aerial vehicles24; cyber 
means of gathering intelligence25; and enhanced communications 
capabilities using, for instance, e-mail, mobile phones, and social media 
platforms that are often encrypted.26 Openly available tools like Google 
 
 20. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chicago Resident David Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to 
Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html. 
 21. Sebastian Rotella, U.S. Prosecutors Indict 4 Pakistanis in Mumbai Attacks, WASH POST (Apr. 
26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us_prosecutors_indict_4_pakistanis_in_mumbai_ 
attacks/2011/04/26/AFaDLhsE_story.html; JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN 
JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 10, 37, 89–91 (2013). 
 22. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Mark Mazzetti and Souad Mekhennet, Attacker in Afghanistan Was a 
Double Agent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/asia/05cia.html. 
 23. Gregory D. Miller, Space Pirates, Geosynchronous Guerrillas, and Nonterrestrial Terrorists, 
33 AIR & SPACE POWER J. 33 (2019). 
 24. Robbie Gramer, Afghan Insurgents Use Drones in Fight Against U.S., FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 
31, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/31/afghanistan-insurgents-use-drones-in-fight-against-u-s-
nato-coalition-forces-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-future-warfare/; Michael Horton, Inside the Chilling 
World of Artificially Intelligent Drones, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/inside-the-chilling-proliferation-of-artificially-
intelligent-drones/. 
 25. Aron Heller, Israel: Hamas Tried to Spy on Soldiers with Fake Dating Apps, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 
3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-03/israel-hamas-tried-to-spy-on-soldiers-
with-fake-dating-apps; Ben Schaefer, The Cyber Party of God: How Hezbollah Could Transform 
Cyberterrorism, GEO. SEC. STU. REV. (Mar. 11, 2018), https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/ 
2018/03/11/the-cyber-party-of-god-how-hezbollah-could-transform-cyberterrorism/. 
 26. Robert Graham, How Terrorists Use Encryption, CTC SENTINEL, June 2016, at 20. 
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Earth further enhance non-State intelligence capabilities.27 Combined with 
traditional advantages in human intelligence (HUMINT)28 and an operating 
environment frequently containing sympathizers, these and other accessible 
technologies are eroding the technical advantage that States have 
traditionally enjoyed. 
Counterintelligence operations are of particular consequence for non-
State parties in State versus non-State party conflicts, for non-State 
operations are often more fragile than those mounted by a State’s armed 
forces.29 To illustrate, if the target of a planned terrorist strike learns the 
attack’s location and timing, it can usually be thwarted. Even very general 
information suggesting an impending attack can result in the target State 
implementing security measures that diminish the likelihood of success, 
especially with respect to “soft” targets, such as poorly-defended civilian 
gathering places. Intelligence on planned attacks also enables traps to be set 
for the non-State attackers, while State forces can leverage their capabilities 
advantage to exploit weak points in an OAG’s planning, positioning, and 
capabilities once those weaknesses become known. Denying their State 
adversary these advantages depends on the effectiveness of the non-State 
group’s counterintelligence activities. 
Of course, non-State intelligence capabilities and organization vary 
widely. The intelligence function in some groups is highly systematized and 
productive, providing both robust information at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels of conflict,30 as well as counterintelligence that can 
frustrate, and exploit, their enemy’s intelligence-gathering efforts. 
Hezbollah, with its “well-structured and increasingly formalised intelligence 
wings” exemplifies such groups.31 The organization’s intelligence gathering 
proficiency is on par with its organizational maturity, as demonstrated, for 
example, by Hezbollah’s extensive use of drones in Syria32 and its tapping 
 
 27. John Ribeiro, Google Earth Used by Terrorists in India Attack, PC WORLD (Nov. 30, 2008), 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/154684/article.html. 
 28. “HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by 
human sources.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 2-01, JOINT AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS at III-39 (2017); see also generally FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra 
note 15. 
 29. Bruce Riedel, Terrorist Intelligence Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield, 12 GEO. J. INT’L 
AFF. 26, 27 (2011). 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 87–89 (discussing the levels of war). 
 31. Michael Horton, Insurgent Groups Seek to Improve Intelligence Capabilities, JANE’S ONLINE 
1–2 (Oct. 12, 2017). 
 32. Nadav Pollak, The Transformation of Hezbollah by its Involvement in Syria, WASH. INST. FOR 
NEAR E. POL’Y, Aug. 2016, at 1, 8, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ 
ResearchNote35-Pollak-2.pdf. 
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of fiber optic cables to intercept data.33 
Yet, not all non-State groups have the means to set up well-developed 
hierarchical intelligence apparatuses.34 These groups tend to establish flatter 
networks that rely heavily on HUMINT to accord them an understanding of 
the military, cultural, political, and economic terrain in which they operate. 
Indeed, in some cases, a State’s technological superiority can be offset by an 
OAG’s “more capable and deeply sourced HUMINT.”35 Examples of 
effective OAGs without advanced war-fighting technology at their disposal 
include Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.36 
The internal structure of non-State intelligence organizations also 
differs from group to group. In some cases, a single organization supplies the 
full range of intelligence and counterintelligence functions. This was the case 
with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) Emni, the terrorist 
organization’s intelligence apparatus. The Emni was responsible for tasks 
that included collecting intelligence for ISIS’ operational use, monitoring 
individuals living in ISIS controlled territory, performing background checks 
on new recruits, recruiting foreign fighters for particular missions, and 
providing information to ISIS’s propaganda organs.37 
By contrast, intelligence functions may be divided between a non-State 
group’s various organizations, as is the case of Hamas, which has distinct 
agencies responsible for counterintelligence, VIP protection, border 
guarding, and law enforcement.38 When distinct, the respective agencies can 
fall under one roof and report through a common chain of command. 
Alternatively, agencies are sometimes organizationally stove-piped. 
As to individual personnel in non-State intelligence organizations, some 
work exclusively for a single intelligence organization, others perform 
functions for multiple such organizations, and still others engage in 
intelligence functions on an ad hoc basis. At times, they move between 
 
 33. Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Communication Network, STRATFOR (May 9, 2008), 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/lebanon-hezbollahs-communication-network. 
 34. A flatter structure of an intelligence organization can also frustrate enemy intelligence 
operations. For instance, “[o]wing largely to security concerns and fears about intercepted 
communications, [ISIS Emni] operatives in charge of planning and conducting attacks outside Islamic 
State-controlled areas have a high degree of operational freedom, and are supposedly independent and 
self-tasking.” Horton, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Anne Speckhard & Ahmet Yayla, The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s 
Intelligence Apparatus, 11 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 2, 3 (2017). 
 38. JIM ZANNOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HAMAS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
20 (2010). 
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organizations, or tasks an organization cannot perform itself are outsourced 
to other organizations, even ones outside the group.39 As an example, David 
Headley, the LeT American mentioned above, was at one point outsourced 
to al Qaeda by LeT for a collection mission against Morgenavisen Jyllands-
Posten, a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons depicting the 
prophet Mohammed.40 
With respect to the question of IHL targetability status, non-State 
intelligence organizations perform a variety of functions and are structured 
in diverse ways. These functions and structures will determine whether their 
personnel are subject to the OAG targeting rules, those for direct 
participation in hostilities, or not at all. 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal question at hand is the status under IHL’s targeting rules of 
non-State individuals who are engaged in intelligence activities during 
armed conflicts. Individuals falling into three categories may be attacked: 
members of a State’s armed forces, members of organized armed groups, and 
civilians who are directly participating in the hostilities.41 
In an international armed conflict, armed forces personnel are 
combatants subject to attack, while most civilians are generally immune 
from attack, a rule imbedded in the principle of distinction.42 Members of 
OAGs involved in the fighting on behalf of a State that is party to the conflict 
usually fail to qualify as combatants,43 but are treated analogously with 
 
 39. Interview by author with government official. 
 40. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 20; JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN 
JIHADISTS TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 89–91 (2013). 
 41. Outside an armed conflict, a State may act in so-called “naked self-defense.” For instance, 
assume a terrorist attack not rising to the level of intensity that qualifies the violence as a non-international 
armed conflict. The State may nevertheless use force in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter and customary international law. However, that use of force will be subject to international human 
rights law limitations on targeting. See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Self-Defense Targeting: Blurring the 
Line Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 88 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 57 
(2012). 
 42. “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48. See also CIHLS, supra note 2, r.1 (“The 
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only 
be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”); DOD MANUAL, supra 
note 2, § 4.2 (explaining that the law of war has recognized that the population of an enemy State should 
be divided between “combatants” and “civilians” to reflect the principle of distinction). 
 43. Pursuant to Additional Protocol I, “Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are 
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.” Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 2, art. 43(2).  The ICRC Commentary to the provision explains, “All members of the armed 
forces are combatants, and only members of the armed forces are combatants. This should therefore 
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respect to IHL’s conduct of hostilities rules. As a result, they are targetable 
at any time, a position widely accepted as customary law.44 
With respect to individuals who are not OAG members, Article 51(3) 
of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides, for 
Parties to the instrument, that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded 
by [the Section on the conduct of hostilities], unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.”45 Note that in contrast to members of an 
OAG, direct participants may only be attacked when they are so 
participating. States that are not Party to the treaty, notably the United States 
and Israel, are bound by the article’s customary law counterpart, which is 
generally set forth in the same terms.46 
During non-international armed conflicts, the genre of armed conflict 
 
dispense with the concept of ‘quasi-combatants’, which has sometimes been used on the basis of activities 
related more or less directly with the war effort. Similarly, any concept of a part-time status, a semi-
civilian, semi-military status, a soldier by night and peaceful citizen by day, also disappears.” INTL. 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1677 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (footnotes 
omitted). [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES]. Combatants are generally understood 
as those individuals who satisfy the criteria of Geneva Convention III for prisoners of war during an 
international armed conflict.  See Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, arts. 4A(1)–(2) (setting out the 
conduct and level of participation that qualifies persons for prison of war status); see also Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, Convention No. IV Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV 
Regulations] (defining what conduct and level of participations makes the laws of war applicable to 
persons not in armies). 
 44.  For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual provides, “Like members 
of an enemy State’s armed forces, individuals who are formally or functionally part of a non-State armed 
group that is engaged in hostilities may be made the object of attack because they likewise share in their 
group’s hostile intent.” DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.7.3.  See also CIHL, supra note 1, at 21 (defining 
“armed forces” as consisting of “all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.”). For an interesting discussion juxtaposing 
the DoD manual approach to direct participation (totality of the circumstances) with that of the ICRC, 
see Ryan T. Krebsbach, Totality of the Circumstances: The DoD Law of War Manual and the Evolving 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 9 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 125 (2017). 
 45.   Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(3). No State has made any reservation to the 
provision. 
 46.  In a textually uncontroversial restatement thereof, Rule 6 of the ICRC’s Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study accurately sets forth the customary rule: “Civilians are protected 
against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” CIHLS, supra note 2, r.6. 
State opinio juris is in accord. See, e.g., FED. POLITICAL DEP’T, 16 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 164, § 119 (1977) (the UK statement at the 
CDDH describing the “valuable reaffirmation of existing customary rules of international law designed 
to protect civilians”). The United Kingdom reaffirmed this position when ratifying the Convention of 
Certain Conventional Weapons. Declaration upon Ratification of the CCW, Feb. 13 1995, § a(iii) (UK) 
(“The terms ‘civilian’ and ‘civilian population’ have the same meaning as in article 50 of the 1st 
Additional Protocol of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Convention unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
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in which the issues raised in this article are most likely to present themselves, 
Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions similarly limits 
protection from “violence to life and person” to “persons taking no active 
part in hostilities.”47 This provision, which is recognized as articulating 
customary international law,48 does not relate to OAGs, for such groups are 
by definition involved in violence. Moreover, Article 1 of Additional 
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that the instrument’s 
material field of application includes conflicts between a State’s armed 
forces and “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups,”49 
thereby clearly envisaging the targeting of OAG members according to the 
same methodology as applies to combatants during international armed 
conflicts. 
Individuals who are not OAG members during a non-international 
armed conflict are subject to a direct participation rule. Article 13(3) of 
Additional Protocol II contains text mirroring its Article 53(1), Additional 
Protocol I, counterpart.50 Although the provision applies only to the limited 
category of non-international armed conflicts governed by the instrument,51 
and only for Parties to the instrument, the customary law rule it restates 
extends to all States during all non-international armed conflicts.52 
 
 47. Geneva Convention I, II, III, IV, supra note 10, art. 3(1). See also Juan Carlos Abella v. 
Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.LN/II.95, doc. 7 rev. §§ 
177–78, 189, 328 (1997) (applying customary international law regarding protection for civilians and 
how participation in hostilities can forfeit that protection); Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Application of IHL Between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Nov. 27, 1991, ¶ 
6, reprinted in MARCO SASSÓLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://casebook.icrc.org/ 
case-study/former-yugoslavia-special-agreements-between-parties-conflicts (binding parties to the 
guidance on this subject in Additional Protocol I); Agreement No. 1 on the Application of IHL between 
the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croat.-Yugoslavia, ¶ 2.5, May 22, 1992, reprinted 
in MARCO SASSÓLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-
study/former-yugoslavia-special-agreements-between-parties-conflicts) (same); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, § 5.2, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (preserving protections for civilians unless they directly participate in 
hostilities). The phrase “active participation in hostilities” is generally understood as the equivalent of 
“direct participation in hostilities.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 629 
(Sept. 2, 1998) (clarifying that “active” and “direct” are synonymous for the Chamber’s purpose); DOD 
MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.8.1.1 (explaining why “direct” and “active” should be treated the same in this 
context). 
 48. See generally CIHL, supra note 1, commentary accompanying r.6 and sources cited therein 
(providing examples of applications). 
 49. Additional Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
 50. Id. art. 13(3). 
 51. Those in which the organized armed group “exercise[s] such control over a part of the territory 
as to enable [it] to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement” the treaty. Id. 
art. 1(1). 
 52. CIHL, supra note 1, r.6 and accompanying commentary; DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C ¶1-56 (2019) 
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OAGs are sometimes active during an international armed conflict 
without acting on behalf of a State that is party to the conflict. These 
situations raise complex issues as to whether their operations, and those 
against them, are subject to the IHL rules applicable in international or non-
international armed conflict. The resolution of that issue has no practical 
bearing on the discussion that follows because, as noted, targeting rules in 
both types of conflict regarding OAG members and civilians who are directly 
participating are in operational terms indistinguishable. 
Ascertaining status is a sine qua non inquiry during targeting 
assessments, for individuals who are neither members of an OAG nor 
otherwise participating directly in the hostilities are not only immune from 
attack, but any incidental harm caused to them must be factored into the 
proportionality calculation that is required before and during an attack on a 
military objective. Pursuant to that rule, “[a]n attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,”53 is unlawful. 
Consider a planned operation against an OAG facility that qualifies as 
a lawful military objective (see below) because it is a military intelligence 
fusion center.54 The prospective attacker would be obligated to assess 
reasonably foreseeable incidental harm to any individuals who are not 
members of the OAG or otherwise directly participating in the hostilities. 
Doing so is required to ensure that harm to them will not be excessive relative 
to the anticipated military value of neutralizing the facility’s intelligence 
contribution. If it is excessive, attacking the facility will be unlawful even 
though it amounts to a valid, indeed critical, military objective. By contrast, 
the attacking force could ignore the presence of any OAG members and 
direct participants when making the proportionality assessment. 
Similarly, such individuals would have to be considered with respect to 
the IHL requirement to take feasible precautions in attack to minimize harm 
to civilians, for instance by selecting a weapon or tactic less likely to cause 
them harm, choosing a different target to achieve the intended effect, or 
warning of the attack, at least so long as said measures would not lessen the 
likelihood of achieving the attack’s desired military effect.55 In the previous 
scenario, for example, intelligence personnel who are either members of an 
 
[hereinafter ARMY MANUAL]. 
 53. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); CIHL, supra note 2, 
r.14; DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.10. 
 54. See infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 55. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 57(2)(a), (3); CIHL, supra note 1, at rr. 5.15–17, 20–
21; DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.11. 
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OAG or are directly participating may be disregarded when deciding how to 
conduct an attack; this would be so even if the attacker’s sole objective was 
physical damage of the intelligence facility. 
Finally, by the rule of equal application of IHL,56 the analysis set forth 
below applies mutatis mutandis to a State’s intelligence organizations and 
personnel.57 In this regard, and in anticipation of the discussion that follows, 
personnel of civilian intelligence organizations are not targetable as 
members of the armed forces, but they may qualify as OAG members if the 
organization performs functions that would render it part of an “overall” 
OAG in the context of a “mixed” non-State group, a situation examined 
below. The complexity of this and related issues demands a case-by-case 
analysis that is subject to numerous factual differences between State and 
non-State intelligence agencies, such as organizational maturity. State 
intelligence organizations are not the subject of this article and will not be 
discussed further. That said, as States consider how to classify intelligence 
personnel and organizations for IHL purposes, they should be cautiously 
attentive to the implications for their own personnel and services. 
IV. STATUS OF OAG INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THEIR PERSONNEL 
The concept of organized armed group exists in contradistinction to that 
of the regularly constituted armed forces during both international and non-
international armed conflicts. In the specific context of targeting (as distinct 
from detention) during the former, and even though they are primarily State-
on-State conflicts, international armed conflicts can involve OAGs on one or 
both (state) sides. All groups engaged in the hostilities58 during these 
conflicts qualify as “organized armed groups” unless their members meet the 
demanding criteria for “combatant” status.59 Examples of such OAGs 
 
 56. See generally Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under 
Pressure, 872 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931 (2008) (explaining the principle of equal application of law 
and describing criticisms of it in the context of modern conflicts). 
 57. There may be domestic law implications based on the difference between State intelligence 
organizations and their non-State counterparts, as when the State criminalizes the provision of support to 
a non-State group during a non-international armed conflict. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012) 
(regarding material support to terrorism under US federal law). Further, status as members of a State’s 
armed forces affects whether intelligence personnel enjoy combatant immunity from prosecution and 
prisoner of war status as lawful combatants during an international armed conflict. ICRC, Unprivileged 
Belligerent, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? (Apr. 4, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://casebook.icrc.org/ 
glossary/unprivileged-belligerent. 
 58. The term hostilities refers to the “[collective] resort by the parties to the conflict to means and 
methods of injuring the enemy.” INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 43. 
 59. Id. at 27–28; DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.8.2.1. The combatant status criteria for 
individuals who are not members of the armed forces but instead of organized armed groups belonging 
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include contractors engaging in combat operations for a party, volunteer 
groups that fail to comply with IHL as required by Article 4A(2) of Geneva 
Convention III, and law enforcement agencies that are conducting operations 
in support of a party without being incorporated into the armed forces.60 
Insurgent groups engaged in hostilities against a State party to the conflict 
are also OAGs. 
In non-international armed conflict, by contrast, the legal status of the 
combatant does not exist and therefore cannot serve as a reference point from 
which to identify OAGs. Rather, with respect to such conflicts, the term 
“organized armed group” usually denotes the armed forces of the non-State 
party to the conflict and includes both dissident armed forces that have 
rebelled against the government and other armed groups that draw their 
membership from the civilian population, including terrorist groups.61 It can 
also encompass non-State groups operating on behalf of the government, as 
in the case of organized vigilantes.62 
Three determinative questions animate the OAG targeting analysis in 
all armed conflicts. First, when does a group qualify as an OAG such that it 
becomes subject to OAG-specific targeting rules? Second, some non-State 
groups involved in an armed conflict engage in both military and non-
military activities. As a matter of law, they are sometimes properly 
considered as comprised of both an OAG and civilian organizations. This 
necessitates determining when intelligence organizations and personnel 
therein are part of the group’s OAG and targetable as such. Third, under what 
circumstances do individuals qualify as members of an OAG who are subject 
to lawful attack on that basis? This is, as discussed below, a complex issue, 
one compounded by an on-going dispute over whether all members of an 
OAG are targetable or only those with a “continuous combat function.” 
A. Definition of Organized Armed Group 
“Organized armed group” is an IHL term of art that refers to the “armed 
or military wing of a non-State party [to the conflict]; its armed forces in a 
functional sense.”63 The conditions precedent to qualification of a group as 
 
to a party to the conflict are set forth in Geneva Convention III, supra note 11, art. 4A(2). They include 
being commanded by a person responsible for his or her subordinates, wearing a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance that denotes status; carrying arms openly, and conducting operations in 
accordance with IHL. Id. 
 60. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(3). 
 61. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 35. 
 62. See generally AUC, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://colombiareports.com/auc/ 
(discussing a non-state group such as the paramilitary forces in Colombia, especially the United Self 
Defense Forces of Colombia). 
 63.  INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 32. 
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an OAG, and consequent application of OAG-specific targeting rules to its 
members, are 1) that it be “organized,” 2) that it be “armed,” and 3) that its 
operations have a nexus to the conflict.64 Although little definitive guidance 
on the three criteria exists in the targeting context,65 the concept of 
“organized armed group” occupies a place of prominence in the law on 
classification of an armed conflict as non-international. Therefore, it is to 
discussion of the term in that regard that IHL experts look to animate its 
meaning vis-à-vis the law of targeting.66 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions references “parties 
to a conflict.”67 This notion of “parties” is the basis for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) conclusion, which is 
widely accepted as reflecting customary law, that only when a group is 
sufficiently organized can it qualify as a party to a non-international armed 
conflict.68 The logic is straightforward. If a group is not organized, it cannot 
logically be characterized as the “enemy” and therefore identifiable as a 
“party” to the conflict by other participants. Moreover, only groups that are 
organized are capable of enforcing IHL, a further requirement for 
characterization as a party to a conflict.69 It must be cautioned in the latter 
regard that the fact that an organization fails to enforce IHL in practice does 
 
 64. Michael Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
A Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 5, 16–18 (2010). 
 65. For a robust critical analysis of the concept of organized armed group, see Watkin, supra note 
18. See also Gloria Gaggioli, Targeting Individuals Belonging to an Armed Group, 51 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 901 (2018) (discussing the challenges associated with the notions of “organized armed 
group” and “membership” therein). 
 66. Interestingly, most IHL experts and States have embraced the term “organized armed group” 
without a robust discussion of its appropriateness vis-à-vis targeting. This was despite the fact that it 
derives from a separate issue of law, classification of conflict, that is animated by a different object and 
purpose. 
 67. Common Article 3, supra note 10. 
 68. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). The tribunal 
described such conflicts as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State.”  Id.  Other international tribunals have adopted the 
same definition of non-international armed conflict. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 619 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 92 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal 
Against “Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence,” ¶ 32 (May 
16, 2005) (Robertson, J., separate opinion); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 233 (Jan. 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 229 (June 15, 2006); Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The Rome Statute reflects its 
status as customary international law. 
 69. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). See also Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 89 INT’L L. 
STUD. 233, 247–48 (2013). 
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not preclude it from being a party to the conflict so long as it has the capacity 
to do so. 
In Prosecutor v. Limaj, the ICTY highlighted a range of relevant factors 
when assessing whether a group is organized enough to be deemed an OAG. 
They include the existence of a formal command structure, the creation of 
unit zones of operation, the issuance of orders, the establishment of a 
headquarters, and the existence of disciplinary measures.70 Such factors are 
not necessary, but, along with others, are pertinent in determining whether 
an armed group is sufficiently structured to qualify as “organized.” 
Other decisions are in accord. For instance, the International Criminal 
Court stated in Prosecutor v. Lubanga that the condition of organization 
“focuses on the need for the armed groups in question to have the ability to 
plan and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time.”71 
Later, in Prosecutor v. Bemba, the same court noted that OAGs “must be 
under responsible command. In this regard, responsible command entails 
some degree of organization of those armed groups, including the possibility 
to impose discipline and the ability to plan and carry out military 
operations.”72 
The ICRC’s Commentary on the term “organized armed group” in 
Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II sheds further light on the meaning of 
“organized.” That provision extends the material field of application for 
Parties to the instrument beyond Common Article 3 to certain armed 
conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups.”73 According to the Commentary, the term organized armed 
groups 
implies some degree of organization of the insurgent armed group or 
dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean that there is a 
hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular 
armed forces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of 
planning and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations, and 
on the other, of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto authority.74 
 
 70. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 94–129 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005). See also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 
60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-
82-T at ¶¶ 197–203. 
 71. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 
¶ 234 (Jan. 29, 2007). 
 72. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶¶ 233–34 (June 15, 2006). 
 73. Additional Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
 74. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 3, ¶ 4463. Although OAGs must 
be capable of enforcing IHL, the fact that a group does not do so does not disqualify it from OAG status. 
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In a general sense, an organized group is one that often acts in a 
coordinated and collaborative manner. OAGs plan their missions 
collectively and exercise a degree of command and control over them. Such 
groups usually have an internal disciplinary system or other means of 
ensuring that members or components of the group act in accordance with 
the group’s general aims and specific objectives. They also often share 
logistics and communications assets and systems. There is no minimum size 
requirement for an OAG, but the group should be large enough to have a 
defined leadership, exhibit organizational structure, and operate 
collaboratively. An OAG also cannot simply be a small number of 
individuals who share a common objective and engage in similar activities, 
such as attacking a common enemy in an uncoordinated fashion. This is so 
even if there are informal relationships, as with an individual who simply 
urges friends and work colleagues to engage in violence; rather, acts carried 
out by the individuals must be capable of being characterized as the actions 
of a group of individuals acting as a group. 
Each case must be appraised on its own merits because there is no 
bright-line IHL test for determining whether an armed group is “organized.” 
For instance, some groups are compartmentalized because they realize their 
enemy’s intelligence assets can exploit coordination among a group’s 
components; the more coordination there is within a group, the greater the 
possible points of exploitation. As a result, collaboration and coordination in 
such groups may occur at a high level, with lower level entities exercising a 
fair degree of autonomy in acting pursuant to an overall “commander’s 
intent” by the operational leadership of the group.75 
Of particular relevance in assessing an OAG’s level of organization is 
whether the group has the ability to gather, analyze, and share intelligence 
among its members and organizational elements to support the group’s 
operations. After all, the purpose of intelligence is generally to foster 
accomplishment of the group’s objectives, whether that be through enabling 
the OAG’s conduct of hostilities, precluding an opponent from interfering 
with such operations, or affording the group situational awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, the operational environment. Thus, the fact that a group has a 
dedicated organization or other entity responsible for intelligence, or 
personnel specifically tasked with intelligence duties, is a strong indicator of 
adequate organization. 
If a group lacks the degree of organization necessary to qualify as an 
 
 75. Commander’s intent is a “clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the 
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps 
subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further 
orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 41. 
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OAG, but nevertheless engages in the conduct of hostilities, its members 
may be direct participants in hostilities for targeting purposes. An example 
would be a flash mob that comes together to engage in violence against a 
State’s forces during an armed conflict. Participants thereof need 
information on where to assemble and to find the targeted forces. This 
requires collecting and disseminating that information, often through social 
media. Yet, an individual who is doing so is only targetable as a direct 
participant, for flash mobs and similarly unstructured gatherings, lack the 
degree of organization required to qualify as an OAG.76 
In addition to the organization requirement, groups must be “armed” for 
its members to qualify as targetable under the IHL rules applicable to OAGs. 
Armed denotes a group capable of conducting hostilities, especially 
“attacks,” as IHL defines that term.77 Importantly, the focus is on the group, 
not the individuals comprising it. Thus, the fact that a member of a group 
independently engages in hostile actions does not satisfy the armed 
requirement; the group must act in a concerted manner to engage in the 
hostile actions. In other words, an OAG must have the function of engaging 
in hostilities. 
Given the “armed” requirement, it is unlikely that an intelligence 
organization will qualify as an OAG on its own terms, for gathering, 
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence or engaging in most 
counterintelligence functions, do not suffice to reach this threshold of 
conducting hostilities. However, an intelligence organization occasionally 
includes paramilitary forces that engage in combat operations. Except in the 
unlikely case that it is the only organization conducting hostilities on the part 
of, and at the direction of, the non-State group, the best approach is to 
consider such groups a component of a broader OAG (the overall OAG) 
serving the non-State group. This perspective tracks State military 
organizations, where individual units and services field combat capability 
but comprise a single armed force for the State. 
 
 76. The only exception is that of the levée en masse. The term refers to “[i]nhabitants of a non-
occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units.” Hague IV Regulations, 
supra note 44, art. 2; see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 4A(6) (defining prisoners of 
war); Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 50(1) (defining civilian). Of course, the spontaneity of levée 
en masse means that they are highly unlikely to have dedicated intelligence organizations. Nevertheless, 
any person who supplies information that enables the fighting (tactical intelligence in traditional combat) 
is a member of the levée en masse and targetable as such. If resistance to the invaders becomes continuous 
and the fighters organize themselves, the levée en masse becomes an OAG, at which point OAG targeting 
rules attach. 
 77. Attacks are “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 49. Attacks need not be kinetic in nature. See discussion of this point in 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, r.92 and accompanying commentary. 
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Finally, the activities of a group must have a nexus to the armed conflict 
in question to constitute an OAG under IHL. In other words, their purpose 
must be to advance the position of the group vis-à-vis its involvement in the 
conflict. This requirement is fundamental because some armed groups that 
are present in the battlespace do not intend to engage in conflict-related 
hostilities. A paradigmatic example is a group that performs only law 
enforcement functions. Another is a well-organized group that takes 
advantage of the disarray caused by the conflict to engage in violence for 
purely criminal purposes. However, since, by definition, terrorist 
organizations, rebellious forces, and insurgent groups are armed for reasons 
related to the armed conflict (usually to engage in violence against the 
government or civilian population), this requirement for qualification as an 
OAG seldom poses an obstacle. 
It is sometimes the case, as in Iraq and Syria through the present, that 
multiple OAGs are involved in the same conflict. In this situation, it can be 
difficult to differentiate OAGs from each other when doing targeting 
analysis. The key to deconstructing status in these complex scenarios is to 
determine whether the groups are separate in the sense that they 1) are not 
under the control of a common leadership and 2) engage in operations 
autonomously, even if sometimes cooperatively with other fighting forces. 
This is not a purely academic issue, since separateness can determine 
the applicable law. For instance, recall the requirement that violence reach a 
certain level of intensity before qualifying as a non-international armed 
conflict. If organized groups are separate, satisfaction of that requirement is 
necessary as to each group. It might be that one OAG is involved in a non-
international armed conflict with the State because of the intensity of 
ongoing operations in which it is involved, while another is not. In the latter 
case, international human rights law and domestic law govern the use of 
force against the group, including any members engaged in intelligence 
activities, rather than the targeting rules of IHL. 
To take but one example, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has cooperated 
with Hezbollah and Hamas. In 2017, it even formed a joint command with 
the latter to coordinate activities in Gaza. Yet PIJ has its own leadership, 
makes decisions independently, and at times has differed over policy and 
operations with its partners, as well as its primary State sponsor, Iran.78 The 
targetability of PIJ members engaged in intelligence activities would thus be 
based on the organization’s status as an OAG in its own right, as well as the 
intensity of the hostilities with Israel in which it is engaged, not on its 
 
 78. Daniel Levin, Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, WILSON CTR. (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad. 
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relationship with the other groups. 
B. Mixed Groups 
Many non-State groups that engage in hostilities, such as Hamas, 
Hezbollah, ISIS, and the Taliban, consist of distinct elements, some of which 
perform functions unrelated to the hostilities. For instance, a group might 
include organizations that perform political, judicial, law enforcement, 
social, educational, humanitarian, or other roles that have little to do with the 
hostilities, in addition to fielding fighting forces making up its OAG. Often 
this is the case when a non-State group controls territory, as it must govern 
and provide the basic needs of the civilian population therein. A recent 
example was ISIS, which controlled wide swaths of territory in Iraq and 
Syria.79 The question is which intelligence organizations comprising such a 
group qualify as a component of its OAG for the purposes of targeting law, 
even if they do not independently satisfy the organization and armed 
requirements discussed above. 
Only when a group consists of distinct organizations does the issue of 
mixed groups arise; otherwise, the entire group constitutes the OAG. 
Distinctness denotes organizations that are unequivocally identifiable as 
discrete entities. For instance, they might be included on the non-State 
group’s organizational chart as discrete entities and have separate budgets, 
personnel assignments might be characterized as being transferred into and 
out of them, and, most importantly, the organizations might have their own 
leadership that exercises dominant control over their activities. Some cases 
are clearer than others, thereby necessitating a case-by-case analysis. 
If a group consists of distinct organizations, it is next necessary to 
determine whether any of them are part of the non-State group’s overall 
OAG. As noted earlier, the term “overall OAG” is used here to denote all 
components of a non-State group’s OAG. 
In its Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC stated that “[t]he term organized 
armed group . . . refers exclusively to the armed or military wing of a non-
State party: its armed forces in a functional sense.”80 In fact, a non-State 
group may have multiple fighting wings, much as the armed forces of a State 
party are comprised of multiple combat units. In such cases, if the members 
report to common leadership, the fighting wings make up the non-State 
group’s overall OAG. Intelligence personnel assigned to any of the wings 
are unquestionably members of the OAG on the basis that their wing is part 
 
 79. Rukmini Callimachi, The ISIS Files, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html. 
 80. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 32. 
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thereof. 
Although intelligence organizations are sometimes organizationally 
distinct from the fighting wings, they may nevertheless amount to part of a 
mixed group’s overall OAG based on their function. This is so even when 
they neither engage in combat nor share a common operational chain of 
command with any of the fighting wings. An intelligence organization that 
provides operationally useful intelligence to one or more of the non-State 
Group’s fighting wings is part of the non-State group’s overall OAG by 
virtue of that function. Stated differently, to avoid characterization as part of 
a mixed group’s overall OAG, organizationally distinct entities must refrain 
from activities, such as “combat support” functions, that contribute 
meaningfully to an OAG’s conduct of hostilities. 81 
This begs the question of what sorts of activities by an intelligence 
(including counterintelligence) organization of a mixed non-State group 
facilitate the conduct of hostilities to such an extent that the intelligence 
organization is a component of the OAG and targetable as a result. Self-
evidently, if the activities of the intelligence organization are essential to a 
fighting wing’s conflict-related undertakings, as in providing targeting 
intelligence, preparing order of battle estimates, or tracking enemy force 
maneuver, the group’s OAG includes the intelligence organization. Even if 
the intelligence organization operates with a high degree of independence, it 
is fairly characterized as part of the group’s overall OAG when it plays a role 
that is integral to the OAG’s conduct of hostilities. 
However, because an intelligence organization’s activities might not 
unequivocally render it part of the non-State group’s OAG, it is helpful to 
set forth criteria for assessing when the organization’s activities merit 
characterization as such. A useful approach is to apply, albeit solely by 
analogy, the criteria that the ICRC has proposed for judging whether an 
individual who is not a member of an OAG is directly participating in 
hostilities. After all, if a certain activity engaged in by a civilian renders him 
or her targetable, why should that activity by the group not yield the same 
result? 
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance sets forth the criteria as the 
“constitutive elements of direct participation” in hostilities.82 Although their 
precise application in specific circumstances is highly controversial,83 the 
 
 81. Combat support is “[f]ire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements,” 
whereas combat service support is comprised of “[t]he essential capabilities, functions, activities, and 
tasks necessary to sustain all elements of all operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare.” DOD 
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 40. 
 82. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 46. 
 83. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive 
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three elements generally capture the nature of acts that would render an 
individual a direct participant in hostilities (discussed below),84 and, by 
analogy, an organization as part of a group’s OAG. 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to 
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack (threshold of harm); 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely 
to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation 
of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).85 
The first constitutive element requires that the act in question make a 
material contribution to the weakening of the enemy’s military capacity.86 
Counterintelligence operations intended to deprive the enemy of 
operationally relevant information qualify. So too do activities that enhance 
the OAG’s ability to mount combat operations, for they adversely affect the 
enemy’s relative position in the conflict. For example, surveying terrain and 
patterns of life to identify potential ambush points, gathering information to 
evaluate the willingness of members of the civilian population to provide 
sanctuary, or identifying civilians who might be willing to provide 
information on the enemy fulfil this “threshold of harm” criterion. 
With respect to the second constitutive element, the requirement of 
“direct causation,” a practical approach from a military perspective, and one 
that aligns with the law, is to look at whether the intelligence is of value at 
the tactical, operational, or strategic level of war. The tactical level of 
warfare is where “battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units.”87 It includes the 
collection, analysis, preparation, and dissemination of intelligence that bears 
 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 5 (2010); Yoram Dinstein, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 18 TILBURG L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 84.  For instance, note that US military’s IHL manuals have discussed the notion in a manner that 
is broadly consistent the approach. DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.8.3; ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, 
¶ 2–14 (incorporating the DoD Manual’s considerations by reference). 
 85.  INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 46. 
 86.   In this regard, the ICRC defines hostile acts as those that “by their nature and purpose are 
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.” ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 43, ¶ 1942. The term “participation” refers to the involvement of 
the individual in such acts. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 43. It does not necessarily denote 
conducting hostile acts oneself. 
 87.  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 210. 
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on preparing or conducting individual attacks and defending against those of 
the enemy. For instance, gathering information regarding an enemy unit or 
its disposition in anticipation of an attack against that unit occurs at the 
tactical level, as does conducting reconnaissance of a location at which the 
OAG will carry out an attack. 
Warfare at the operational level denotes that at which “campaigns and 
major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic 
objectives within theaters or other operational areas.”88 Such intelligence, for 
example, would enable the OAG to coordinate and synchronize the actions 
of numerous tactical units or defend against a wide-ranging enemy campaign 
involving multiple operations. Intelligence activity at this level typically 
encompasses a broader area and longer period than that produced and 
consumed at the tactical level of war. 
Lastly, in the State context, the strategic level of warfare is that at which 
“a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or 
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and 
guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those 
objectives.”89 Translated into non-State party context, assessments as to the 
likelihood that the State against which the party is fighting will receive 
foreign support and intelligence about domestic political affairs in that State 
are examples of strategic level intelligence. 
The activities of a non-State group’s intelligence organization(s) in 
support of its OAG’s ability to conduct hostilities at the first two levels are 
direct enough in terms of the relationship between the act and the harm 
befalling the enemy to satisfy this criterion, while those at the strategic level 
usually lack the requisite directness. This is because it is at the tactical and 
operational levels of war that the conduct of hostilities occurs, and at which 
the effect of intelligence on enemy military operations is at its most direct. 
By contrast, intelligence at the strategic level might indirectly enhance the 
ability of the group’s OAG to conduct hostilities, but the causal nexus to 
military operations is too attenuated to have sufficiently direct impact on 
enemy military operations. If the organization performs some operational or 
tactical level intelligence functions, it is a part of the non-State group’s OAG 
irrespective of whether it also shoulders any strategic level intelligence 
responsibilities. 
In addition to considering the level of war served by an intelligence 
function when assessing the direct causation criterion, the nature of the 
linkage between the function and enhancement of the group’s overall OAG’s 
 
 88. Id. at 161. 
 89. Id. at 204. 
SCHMITT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:03 PM 
2020] THE TARGETING OF NON-STATE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND OBJECTS 333 
combat wherewithal—or the diminishment of the enemy’s—further bears on 
whether inclusion of the organization in the OAG is appropriate. 
Counterintelligence, which, as noted, can take the form of counterespionage 
and security activities looms large in this regard. Since counterespionage 
diminishes the capacity of the enemy to conduct intelligence operations 
against the OAG, the causal nexus between avoiding potential harm to the 
OAG’s military operations and counterintelligence is usually quite direct.90 
Counterespionage operations, for example, can uncover specific attacks for 
which the enemy is laying the intelligence foundation or deny the enemy 
access to the OAG’s own operational plans. Although some 
counterespionage activities involve issues at the strategic level of war, as in 
the case of foiling efforts by the enemy to gather information as to the OAG’s 
international support or its internal political dynamics, most seek to thwart 
enemy intelligence operations designed to affect OAG activities at the 
operational or tactical level of war. 
By contrast, consider an organization that performs personnel or 
operational security (OPSEC) functions, like doing background checks 
before allowing access to sensitive material or establishing and monitoring 
procedures for ensuring the security of such material. These and similar 
security activities may have effects at the tactical and operational levels of 
war, for instance by ensuring that OAG members who operate at those levels 
are trustworthy and that sensitive material related to ongoing operations is 
secured. Although they constitute a form of counterintelligence, the causal 
connection between such activities and any harm caused if they fail is too 
attenuated to justify inclusion of the organizations performing them in a 
mixed non-State group’s OAG. 
The third constitutive element, that of belligerent nexus, would act—if 
applied in the context of OAGs—to exclude intelligence organizations of a 
non-State group that have functions entirely unrelated to the armed conflict. 
As noted above, an organized armed group’s activities must be related to the 
conflict before the IHL rules relating to such groups attach. 
Any intelligence organization fulfilling all three elements would, by the 
 
 90.  As was the case, for instance, with ISIS’s espionage activities and the significance of effectively 
countering them. According to Speckhard and Yayla, “ISIS intelligence agents very cleverly embedded 
their own cadres into groups that opposed them but also ‘turned’ or recruited selected individuals from 
rival groups into assets to serve ISIS. ISIS leaders could thereby obtain key information about opposing 
groups, such as their fortifications and weak spots prior to attacking them. Likewise, these embedded 
spies or ISIS ‘assets’ also murdered important leaders in any opposing group, set off explosions, and even 
ran suicide operations to spread unease and terror throughout a rival group, all with the intent to weaken 
it prior to facing an attack from ISIS.” Speckhard & Yayla, supra note 37, at 6. Obviously, the 
counterespionage activities of groups against which ISIS engaged in such tactics could at times prove of 
existential importance. 
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direct participation in hostilities analogy, constitute part of the non-State 
group’s OAG. To illustrate, Hamas’ Internal Security Service not only has 
counterintelligence responsibilities regarding its Palestinian rivals, but also 
engages in external intelligence activities.91 The former activity does not 
satisfy the criteria (unless Hamas was in a non-international armed conflict 
with its rivals), but the latter do if they facilitate operations against external 
opponents like Israel. Similarly, the Hamas-commanded National Security 
Force provides border guard services, a civilian function, but also has an 
early warning role, a traditional military task.92 Resultantly, either group may 
be classified as part of the Hamas overall OAG. Their personnel accordingly 
qualify as members of Hamas’ OAGs alongside those of its fighting wing, 
the al-Qassam Brigades. 
Finally, an intelligence organization itself might have responsibilities 
that are both military and non-military in nature. When this is so, 
characterization of the entire organization as part of the OAG will depend on 
how it is structured. Distinct departments that are clearly identifiable as such 
and that perform only functions that do not contribute to the OAG’s fighting 
capacity would not be considered part of the non-State group’s OAG. As an 
example, an intelligence organization might have an element responsible for 
military intelligence and another that generates only law enforcement-related 
intelligence. So long as it is organizationally distinct and identifiable to 
enemy forces as such (perhaps by being based in a separate location and 
wearing different uniforms), the latter is not part of the OAG, and its 
members may only be attacked pursuant to the rules governing direct 
participation in the hostilities by civilians that are described below. It must 
be emphasized that if the intelligence organization lacks clearly distinct sub-
elements that exclusively perform tasks unrelated to the conflict, the entire 
organization would be part of the non-State group’s OAG. 
C. Qualification as a Member of an Organized Armed Group 
Intelligence organizations usually serve as part of a broader non-State 
OAG by providing critical combat support to facilitate the planning and 
execution of hostilities; in other words, they operate in a manner that 
resembles intelligence units in a State’s armed forces. When this is so, the 
members of the intelligence organization are members of the OAG for 
targeting purposes, although, as will be discussed, a degree of controversy 
exists over whether all are targetable (except for medical and religious 
personnel and those who are hors de combat). 
 
 91. Zinnotti, supra note 38, at 20. 
 92. Id. 
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This begs the question of qualification as a member of the OAG, for 
individuals with very different relationships to an OAG can provide it 
information of intelligence value.93 It is accordingly necessary to distinguish 
OAG members performing intelligence related activities from other 
individuals who, while not members, engage in activities that can be 
characterized as “intelligence” in nature. The former are targetable as 
members of an OAG, whereas the latter may only be attacked, as explained 
below, for such time as they directly participate in the hostilities. 
Members of a State’s armed forces usually become part of those forces 
through an official recruitment process or conscription regulated by the 
State’s domestic law, although they may also be impressed into service. 
Once in the armed forces, there are ranks, uniforms and other indicia that 
signal membership. Organized armed groups, including their intelligence 
organizations such as ISIS’s Emni,94 likewise may have procedures for 
joining, even if those procedures tend to be less formal and unregulated by 
law. If an established process exists for becoming a member of an OAG, 
those who complete it qualify. Similarly, rank, uniforms, identity cards and 
other clear-cut indicators of OAG membership can serve to signal 
membership of intelligence personnel in an OAG, whether they are part of a 
distinct organization in the group performing intelligence functions or not.95 
Yet, much of the time, recruitment procedures may be informal, as in 
simply taking an oath of allegiance or undergoing short political 
indoctrination training. They may even be lacking altogether, as when 
members of the local population are forced to join an OAG or when they 
simply begin to participate in the group’s activities or otherwise accompany 
it. Complicating matters is the fact that members of an OAG often wear 
civilian clothing or otherwise conceal their affiliation with the group. 
Absent clear indicia, the most significant indicator of membership will 
likely be the existence of a de facto superior–subordinate relationship 
between the OAG’s leadership or other members with authority and the 
individual or intelligence organization of which he or she is part. Following 
their binding orders or other specific instructions, as distinct from mere 
 
 93. On membership in an OAG, see generally E. Corrie Westbrook Mack & Shane R. Reeves, 
Tethering the Law of Armed Conflict to Operational Practice: Organized Armed Group Membership in 
the Age of ISIS, 36 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334 (2018). 
 94. “[T]here were ten grueling levels of training one had to undergo to become an Emni operative, 
training that included running, jumping, push-ups, parallel bars, crawling, swimming, scuba diving, 
sleeping in holes in the ground, navigating by the stars, and surviving on limited food and water rations 
and under difficult conditions in the desert. Upon completion of all ten levels, recruits were blindfolded 
and driven to pledge their allegiance (still blindfolded) to then-Emni leader, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani.” 
Speckhard & Yayla, supra note 37, at 13. 
 95. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.7.3.1; ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶ 2-61. 
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suggestions or encouragement, is compelling evidence of this relationship. 
For instance, the fact that an individual has observed and reported on enemy 
activity at a set time and place pursuant to an OAG’s direction is strong 
support for characterizing the individual as a member of the group. 
The related factors of regularity and nature of participation in the 
OAG’s activities are also a compelling sign of membership.96 They are 
particularly telling in the absence of evidence that orders to perform a 
particular action have been followed. Whereas ad hoc and infrequent 
participation may suggest mere support for the OAG’s cause, regular and 
recurring involvement provides an objectively reasonable basis to imply 
membership. Consider individuals who periodically inform the OAG of the 
location and activities of enemy forces because the OAG pays for such 
information on a by-report basis.97 Or take members of a civilian population 
in territory controlled by a non-State group who report persons engaging in 
suspicious behavior. Neither are members of the OAG—although they are 
likely to be targetable as direct participants in the hostilities, a topic 
discussed below. But once the service becomes regularized, as in receiving 
a recurring salary to provide information, it becomes reasonable to 
characterize them as members of the group. This is so irrespective of whether 
they are part of a dedicated intelligence organization within the OAG or are 
acting on an individual basis. 
Regularity is especially convincing when the activities engaged in 
mirror those performed by combat support personnel of a State’s armed 
forces. If regular activities are such that the OAG relies upon them to conduct 
hostilities, the individuals concerned are likely OAG members irrespective 
of whether they have joined it by any set formal procedure. For targeting 
purposes, this “functional” membership would generally suffice.98 
Regularity must be distinguished from voluntariness (or lack thereof). 
The latter is not a reliable indicator of membership because compelled 
participation in the OAG’s activities, even under threat of death, does not 
 
 96. The ICRC has opined that “[c]ontinuous combat function requires lasting integration into an 
organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict.” 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 34. Although the author disagrees with the continuous combat 
function approach, the ICRC’s insistence on integration supports regularity as an indicator of membership 
in an OAG. 
 97. ISIS had paid informants wherever they operated to create fear of defying the group. Speckhard 
& Yayla, supra note 37, at 7. 
 98. See, e.g., ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶ 1-92 (“In addition, these armed groups may rely on 
individuals who are not formally members of the groups but are functionally part of those organizations. 
These individuals may be regarded as part of the group constructively, even if not members in fact.”). See 
also id., ¶¶ 2-63 to -64; DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 4.18.4, 5.7.3.2. For an argument focusing on the 
nature of conduct as the key factor in assessing membership, see David McBride, Who is a Member: 
Targeted Killings against Members of Organized Armed Groups, 30 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 47 (2012). 
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preclude membership.99 This is so whether the individual is forced to fight 
for the group or simply perform intelligence-related activities like 
surveillance. 
Mere sympathy for an OAG’s cause, and even occasional intelligence 
activities in support of it, are insufficient standing alone to confirm 
membership. Indeed, even acting “for the cause” is insufficient. To illustrate, 
ISIS-inspired local jihadists unknown to ISIS have carried out attacks 
requiring extensive intelligence preparation. When the attacks occurred, ISIS 
Emni sometimes tried to contact those involved through video games or 
social media in order to acquire material that could be used to back up claims 
that the attack was mounted on behalf of ISIS and launch a propaganda effort 
to that effect.100 This, however, did not render the individual or any group 
with which the attackers were affiliated a member of ISIS. It would only be 
once such contact bears fruit and results in the individual or group joining 
ISIS that membership for targeting purposes would attach. 
Along these lines, individuals and groups often pledge allegiance to an 
OAG. Doing so does not ipso facto authenticate membership in the OAG. 
However, if the pledge or oath signals a meeting of the minds between the 
individual or group and the OAG, it may suffice to qualify the individual or 
group as part of the OAG.101 Yet this would require that the OAG know of 
them, in some manner signal their acceptance into the group, and 
subsequently act as an integrated entity through coordination, collaboration, 
command, and control. 
The phenomenon of terrorist groups around the world swearing 
“bay’at” (an oath of allegiance to a leader) to ISIS and thereby becoming 
affiliates, or “wiliats,” is instructive.102 Only in those cases in which a 
superior-subordinate organizational relationship emerged whereby ISIS 
directed and controlled the operations of the group swearing allegiance, did 
the latter become part of ISIS’ OAG. Should this occur, support by the group 
of ISIS undertakings may take the form of intelligence activities, such as 
surveilling potential targets. But absent such a relationship, and even if the 
group periodically cooperates and collaborates with ISIS, the groups would 
not be part of ISIS’s OAG. 
Perhaps most telling is an OAG’s treatment of an individual engaged in 
 
 99.  INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 59–60 (in the context of direct participation). 
 100.  Speckhard & Yayla, supra note 37, at 9. 
 101.  On the relationship between such groups, see Peter Margulies, Networks in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining Organized Armed Group, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 54 (2013). 
 102.  Joel Day, The ISIS Bandwagon: Under What Conditions Do Groups Pledge Support?, B.U.  
INST. ON CULTURE, RELIGION & WORLD AFF. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.bu.edu/cura/files/2016/03/ 
The-ISIS-Bandwagon-V3.pdf. 
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intelligence activities as a member and, correspondingly, the individual 
acting as one. For example, if the group has distinct billeting facilities, does 
the individual live in them? Does the individual attend group meetings and 
gatherings, recruit others to join the OAG, or receive a regular salary from 
the OAG? If the group maintains membership rolls, does the individual 
appear thereon?103 When no established process for becoming a member 
exists, all the aforementioned factors, and numerous others, have to be 
considered ensemble in making case-by-case determinations of membership. 
D. Targetable Members of an Organized Armed Group 
In its Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC took an very narrow approach to 
OAG membership.104 Emphasizing that it is often difficult to determine 
whether an individual is a member, the ICRC suggested that “the decisive 
criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is whether 
a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her 
direct participation in hostilities (hereinafter ‘continuous combat 
function’).”105 For the ICRC, the continuous combat function “distinguishes 
members of the organized fighting forces of a non-State party from civilians 
who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or 
unorganized basis or who assume exclusively political, administrative, or 
other non-combat functions.”106 It defines the continuous combat function 
by reference to the constitutive elements of direct participation—i.e., 
threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus—set forth earlier. 
This approach confuses the question of who has OAG member status 
with that of whom within the group is targetable. By treating members of the 
OAG who do not satisfy the three criteria as non-members, the ICRC creates 
a legal fiction. The better approach is to acknowledge that there may be OAG 
members whose primary duties do not involve combat-related functions, as 
is the case with a State’s armed forces. Indeed, sometimes those individuals 
might have joined the OAG through established procedures, wear its uniform 
or other indicia of membership, be carried on the OAG’s membership rolls, 
or perform functions that, albeit not combat-related, are essential to the 
 
 103. For instance, ISIS’s Emni “keeps detailed lists and personnel files on the foreign fighters that 
join them, including letters of application detailing their level of religious knowledge, former military 
training and terrorism credentials, as well as their telephone numbers, and even their hobbies.” Speckhard 
& Yayla, supra note 37, at 7. 
 104. Some States have adopted the approach. See, e.g., FED. PROSECUTOR GEN., FUEL TANKERS 
CASE 47–48 (2010) (“If they have functionally joined an organized armed group in a non-international 
armed conflict as fighters, they are retaining this status as armed fighters until they have recognizably 
and finally given up this function.”). 
 105. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 33. 
 106. Id. at 34. 
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functioning of the OAG, such as financial, administrative, and logistical 
duties. It is counterfactual to assert that they are not members of the group. 
In part, the ICRC justifies its disjunctive approach on the basis that it 
can be difficult to distinguish members of an OAG from individuals who are 
not members.107 Yet, this is not always the case. For example, members of 
some OAGs wear uniforms, while in others the organizational structure of 
the non-State group is very clear, with fighting wings designated as such. An 
example of the former is the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC),108 whereas the al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas illustrate the later.109 
Moreover, the ICRC’s approach can incentivize an OAG’s failure to 
implement measures that provide objective indicia of membership, thereby 
exposing civilians in the conflict area to increased risk of reasonably 
mistaken identity. 
The issue, though, is these individuals’ targetability, regarding which 
there are two views. The ICRC takes the position that since those without a 
continuous combat function are civilians, they may not be directly attacked 
unless and while they directly participate in hostilities.110 Yet, in some cases, 
an OAG’s opponent can know that the individual concerned is a member of 
an OAG (e.g., because of the uniform worn), but not know whether the 
person’s function involves intelligence activities qualifying as a continuous 
combat function. Further compounding matters, the prospective attacker 
may not know when that individual is engaged in activities that would open 
the door to attack consistent with the “for such time” aspect of the direct 
participation rule. Effectively, the member of the OAG will be immune from 
attack, even though he or she is without question a member of the enemy 
forces. This is an untenable situation from an operational perspective. 
The ICRC’s approach also generates incongruency between members 
of the OAG and the State’s armed forces. While the latter may be attacked 
irrespective of their duties—with certain express exceptions for non-
combatant members of the armed forces—the targetability of OAG members 
depends, by this approach, on the nature of their function as it relates to the 
conduct of hostilities. The result is a paradoxical situation in which members 
 
 107. Id. at 33. 
 108. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Insignia or Armbands Worn by Members 
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and the United Self-
Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC); Whether Such Markings are 
Worn at All Times (2000 - May 2003), Doc COL40240.E (May 20, 2003), https://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3f7d4d7834.html. 
 109. Central Intelligence Agency, Gaza, WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html. 
 110. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 33. 
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of a State’s military may be lawfully targeted, but OAG personnel 
performing precisely the same function may not.111 For example, State 
military intelligence personnel who contribute solely to strategic intelligence 
may be attacked. By contrast, an OAG member involved in the production 
of the same type of intelligence would not qualify as having a continuous 
combat function and thus would be treated as a civilian immune from attack 
unless he or she engaged in some other activity that qualified as direct 
participation, and then only for such time as it took place. 
This inconsistency is further exacerbated by the fact that members of a 
State’s armed forces are combatants during an international armed conflict 
and represent the sovereign State during a non-international armed conflict. 
As such, they are permitted to engage in hostilities in the sense that they 
operate under the authority of the State.112 By contrast, IHL does not 
countenance the involvement of non-State individuals or groups. An 
interpretation of targetability status that affords the latter greater protection 
from attack (and other conduct of hostilities protections) creates an ironic 
imbalance in the law. 
The more operationally logical approach, and the one that reflects IHL’s 
principle of equal application, is to treat all members of an OAG as 
targetable, with the same exceptions that apply to members of the State’s 
armed forces.113 By this approach, there are two steps in the targeting 
analysis. First, the contours of the OAG in question must be identified, with 
particular attention paid to the challenging case of mixed non-State parties. 
Second, the attacker must determine whether the individual in question is a 
member of that OAG. 
These assessments can be difficult in any context, but especially in 
relation to intelligence organizations. This is because they tend to be 
compartmentalized internally and masked externally in order to maintain 
secrecy.  After all, the more the enemy knows about the membership, 
structure, and functions of an intelligence organization, the greater the risk 
to its operations and operatives. But challenges in application do not negate 
the clarity of this basic rule: All members of an OAG, as delineated above, 
are targetable. 
 
 111. On the issue of the need for equal treatment from a highly experienced senior military officer, 
see R. Patrick Huston, A Practical Perspective on Attacking Armed Groups, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
919 (2018). 
 112. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a 
Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third 
Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”). 
 113. For instance, see the position taken by the United States in DOD MANUAL, supra note 12, § 
5.7.3. See also ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶ 2-60. 
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V. DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY CIVILIANS IN HOSTILITIES 
The targetability of individuals who are not members of an OAG but 
nevertheless engage in intelligence activities is determined based upon the 
three constitutive elements of direct participation in hostilities set forth 
above. Recall that they lose their protection from attack and are excluded 
from proportionality calculations and precautions in attack analyses 1) for 
such time as they 2) directly participate in hostilities.114 
As to satisfaction of the three constitutive elements, the discussion 
above with respect to qualification of intelligence organizations as part of a 
mixed non-State group’s OAG applies mutatis mutandis here. Accordingly, 
individuals who are not members of an OAG but who engage in intelligence 
activities related to the conflict that directly affect an OAG’s military 
capability lose their conduct of hostilities protections for such time as they 
so participate. 
What is unique with respect to individuals who are directly participating 
in hostilities is the temporal issue noted above. Whereas OAG members are 
always targetable, civilians who engage in intelligence activities amounting 
to direct participation are only targetable while so participating. The “for 
such time” text has focused attention on two issues, the duration of the 
targetability and how to treat individuals who directly participate in 
hostilities on a recurring basis. 
The duration controversy concerns the window of targetability with 
respect to a single act of direct participation. There is general agreement that 
a civilian loses protection from the time he or she begins preparing to 
participate until returning from such participation;115 the paradigmatic case 
is preparing go out on an ambush, ambushing the enemy, and returning from 
the attack. The disagreement surrounds precisely when preparation has 
begun and the operation ends.116 
That debate has less traction in the intelligence context than with respect 
to attacks and other classic conduct of hostilities activities because the period 
of intelligence activities engaged in by individuals who are not members of 
an OAG is often clear. Consider a civilian who observes the OAG’s 
 
 114. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 13(2); 
DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 5.8.2.1, 5.8.3; CIHL, supra note 2, r.6. 
 115. This is the position of the ICRC; no one disputes that a direct participant is at least targetable 
during this window. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 65. 
 116. Yoram Dinstein has opined, correctly in the author’s opinion, that “in demarcating the relevant 
time span in the course of which the person concerned is actually taking part in hostilities, it is permissible 
to go as far as reasonably possible both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ from the actual engagement.” 
Yoram Dinstein, Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflict, 84 INT’L 
L. STUD. 183, 188–89 (2008). 
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adversary positioning itself. That civilian goes to the OAG and reports the 
activity. In such a case, the individual will be directly participating from the 
time he or she observed the enemy activity until returning home after making 
the report. Or consider a situation in which the OAG asks a civilian to be at 
a location to observe the adversary’s activities. The period of direct 
participation begins once he or she sets out and ends upon returning home. 
The second temporal controversy is more relevant in the intelligence 
context. Labeled the “revolving door” issue, it arises when an individual 
engages on a repeated basis in intelligence activities that qualify as direct 
participation. By the ICRC’s interpretation, each act of direct participation 
must be considered separately, such that the individual undertaking them 
enjoys full civilian status between the acts of direct participation.117 In a 
sense, the individual is going through a normative revolving door, thereby 
losing and regaining civilian protection over and over. 
Yet, intelligence activities are seldom persistent in the sense of being 
relatively continuous, at least when humans, as distinct from technology, 
gather and disseminate the information. In many situations, the intelligence 
and counterintelligence assets function within what is best understood as an 
intelligence “cycle,” in which information is constantly gathered, analyzed, 
disseminated, and then reassessed. The cycle continues throughout the 
duration of the armed conflict. In this cycle, individuals who are not OAG 
members might supply intelligence information or engage in related 
activities such as monitoring and reporting on enemy activities on an 
intermittent, albeit recurring, basis. 
By the ICRC approach, they would be immune from attack between 
those periods. This poses a serious practical problem on the battlefield. The 
OAG’s adversary will in most cases be unaware of when the individual is 
engaging in the intelligence activities but might have reliable intelligence 
confirming that he or she is repeatedly doing so. Applying the ICRC 
approach would prohibit an attack on the individual unless caught “in the 
act,” an unlikely prospect given that intelligence activities are usually 
clandestine. Effectively, most civilians who directly participate in the 
hostilities by engaging in intelligence activities would de facto be immune 
from attack most of the time, either by operation of law or due to operational 
factors, as when gathering intelligence remotely by cyber means. 
The ICRC’s interpretation of the “for such time” component of the 
direct participation rule has been heavily criticized for turning a blind eye to 
the reality of the battlefield, as it skews the delicate balance between military 
 
 117. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 70 (“The ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection is 
an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL.”). 
SCHMITT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:03 PM 
2020] THE TARGETING OF NON-STATE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND OBJECTS 343 
necessity and humanitarian considerations that undergirds IHL.118 To be 
valid, the interpretation of “for such time” must both account for 
humanitarian concerns and offer a militarily sensible means of application. 
This balance can only be achieved if an individual known to repeatedly 
engage in intelligence or counterintelligence activities that qualify as acts of 
direct participation is considered as engaging in a continuous course of 
conduct throughout which he or she loses the targeting protections non-
participating civilians enjoy. Once the individual desists altogether from 
qualifying activities, protection would be regained.119 
This is an approach that is not without its own challenges. First, it must 
be determined whether the gaps between intelligence activities qualifying as 
acts of direct participation are narrow enough to justify labeling them a single 
course of conduct. Unfortunately, there is no bright-line test for making this 
assessment, other than to suggest that a continuous course of conduct is never 
“spontaneous” or “sporadic.”120 Second, it may not be clear when an 
individual has decided to refrain from future qualifying activities. In such a 
case, a mistaken conclusion that the targeted individual will continue to 
conduct intelligence activities must be assessed against a standard of 
reasonableness in same or similar circumstances.121 This is appropriate, since 
the risk of mistaken attack should fall on the civilian who decided to engage 
directly in the hostilities without any right to do so under IHL. 
VI. STATUS OF OBJECTS INVOLVED IN NON-STATE 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
In some situations, a party to the conflict might wish to conduct an 
attack against objects used by OAGs or individuals that are performing 
intelligence tasks. The determination of whether the object is lawfully 
subject to attack is not made by reference to the status issues discussed 
above. Rather, targetability depends on the object’s qualification as a 
 
 118. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 795–839 (2010). 
 119. See ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶¶ 2-17 to -18. 
 120. The Interpretive Guidance uses the terms sporadic and spontaneous to refer to conduct that does 
not qualify as a continuous combat function (an approach with which the author disagrees). See 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 32–35. Although used here in the context of direct 
participation rather than organized armed groups, the same logic supports exclusion of spontaneous and 
sporadic actions from the ambit of a course of conduct involving direct participation. During the 
discussions among the experts involved in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance project, there was a robust 
discussion on the subject (the author was a participant). See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], 
FIFTH EXPERT MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 35–44 (2008). 
 121. For a discussion of a reasonable mistake of fact in the IHL context, see Marko Milanovic, 
Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part II, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethal-force-in-international-law-part-ii/. 
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military objective. To take a simple example, the home of an OAG’s 
intelligence director is not targetable per se, but may be attacked if also used 
as a location for exercising command and control over the group’s 
intelligence operations.122 
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I sets forth the definition of 
military objective in what is a universally accepted formulation for both 
international and non-international armed conflicts: “[M]ilitary objectives 
are . . . those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military of advantage.”123 When objects related to 
intelligence activities satisfy this two-pronged test, they may be attacked.  
Further, any expected collateral damage caused to the objects during an 
attack on another military objective does not factor into the proportionality 
calculation, and there is no requirement to take precautions to avoid harming 
them during that attack. 
As to the textual criteria yielding “definite military advantage,” 
“nature” denotes an object that is military in character, as in an OAG’s 
military-specifications reconnaissance drone.124 A military objective by 
“use” is an otherwise civilian object that presently is being used for military 
purposes,125 whereas “purpose” refers to one that will be so used in the 
future.126 Accordingly, all objects used or intended to be used by an OAG or 
a direct participant in hostilities to engage in conflict-related intelligence 
activities are military objectives. These could range from a vehicle from 
which an OAG surreptitiously monitors enemy movements along a roadway 
and the cell phone used to report on them to sophisticated cyber equipment 
employed to penetrate enemy cyber infrastructure and exfiltrate data. In 
certain cases, a location may render an object a military objective,127 as with 
 
 122. Pursuant to the “use” criterion found in Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, at art. 52(2). 
 123. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 52(2); CIHL, supra note 2, r.8; DOD MANUAL, supra 
note 3, § 5.6. The definition is in accordance with other treaties. See, e.g., Amended Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 2(6), May 3, 1996, 
2048 U.N.T.S. 93. For a discussion on qualifying as a lawful military object subject to attack, see Michael 
N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of 
Targeting, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 379, 391–97 (2014). 
 124. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 43, ¶ 2020; PROGRAM ON 
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, cmt. accompanying r.22(a) (2013) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]. 
 125. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 43, ¶ 2022; AMW MANUAL, supra note 
124, cmt. accompanying r.22(d). 8. 
 126. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 43, ¶ 2022; AMW MANUAL, supra note 
124, cmt. accompanying r.22(c). 
 127. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 43, ¶ 2021; AMW MANUAL, supra note 
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a high point in an urban area that the OAG uses to observe and report on its 
enemy’s tactical movement. It must be cautioned that designating an object 
or location used for intelligence purposes as a military objective cannot be 
based upon mere speculation or instinct;128 such a determination must be 
reasonable in the attendant circumstances and is therefore made on a case-
by-case basis. 
As with designation as an OAG and direct participation in hostilities, 
there must be a nexus between the object in question and military operations. 
This is clear from the dual requirements that the object make an effective 
contribution to the enemy’s military actions and that its destruction, capture, 
or neutralization afford the attacking force a definite military advantage.129 
Thus, for instance, by the same logic that precludes a law enforcement 
intelligence organization from qualifying as part of an OAG if it performs 
purely civilian policing duties, the equipment of that organization consists of 
civilian objects protected from attack and that count as collateral damage if 
likely to be harmed during an attack on a military objective. 
However, like the group that performs both civilian and military 
functions, an object used for both civilian and military purposes is a valid 
military objective subject to attack.130 The extent to which the OAG uses 
these so-called “dual use” objects for military purposes has no bearing on 
their qualification as such.131 To illustrate, a non-State group’s law 
enforcement IT equipment that is regularly used to conduct remote searches 
related to criminal activity, but occasionally employed to penetrate enemy 
military systems to gather intelligence, is unambiguously a military 
objective. 
The sole exception to the rule that even slight military use renders 
equipment a military objective arises when facets of the same object are 
clearly separate and distinct, and one or more of them serves no military 
 
124, cmt. accompanying r.22(b). 
 128. DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.4.3.2; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT TARGETING, at A-2 to -
3 (2013). See also the unofficial, but authoritative, commentary on the Additional Protocols. MICHAEL 
BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 
336 (2d ed. 2013); Michael N. Schmitt & Michael Schauss, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: Towards 
a Cognitive Framework, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 148, 157–58 (2019). 
 129. DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 5.6.5, 5.6.6.2, 5.6.7.3; ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, ¶ 2018. 
 130. THE STATE OF ISRAEL, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 
DECEMBER 2008 – 18 JANUARY 2009: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS § 223 (2009), https://mfa.gov.il/ 
MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/GazaOperation%20w%20Links.pdf. 
 131. DOD MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.6.1.2; ARMY MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶ 2-36; Christopher 
Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in 
PETER ROWE, THE GULF WAR, 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 63, 73 (1993). 
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purpose.132 Consider an OAG member who has set up an intelligence cell 
with the requisite equipment in the garage of his home located in the yard. 
The garage is a military objective, whereas his house is not. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Targetability of non-State intelligence personnel in armed conflict 
depends on their status under IHL. The initial task in the non-State group 
targeting analysis is to identify the OAG, which must be sufficiently 
organized and armed and conduct activities with a nexus to the conflict to 
qualify as such. 
In some cases, a non-State group is mixed in the sense of containing 
organization engaged in the hostilities, including fighting wings, and 
organizations that perform non-conflict related functions. An intelligence 
organization of the non-State mixed group that is distinct from other 
elements thereof and shoulders no duties that aid a fighting wing’s conduct 
of hostilities is not part of the group’s OAG; its members may only be 
attacked pursuant to the rules on direct participation. 
However, if the organization engages in any activities facilitating the 
conduct of hostilities, including many counterintelligence functions, it is part 
of the group’s overall OAG by virtue of function. The one exception is when 
an intelligence organization is itself mixed and members of a distinct and 
identifiable department therein are engaged in purely civilian functions. 
Such individuals are targetable only in the event they directly participate in 
the hostilities, and not as members of an OAG. Thus, membership is the 
conditio sine qua non to application of the OAG specific targeting rules, 
which permit attack around the clock, subject, of course, to other IHL rules 
such as that of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in 
attack. 
Even assuming membership of intelligence personnel in an OAG, 
including the intelligence component of an overall OAG, disagreement 
remains over whether all members of an OAG are targetable or only those 
who have a continuous combat function. The better view, and the one best 
reflecting the balance between humanitarian considerations and military 
necessity that infuses IHL, is the former. Nevertheless, even by the latter, 
most individuals in a non-State group involved in intelligence activities at 
the tactical or operational levels of war would have a continuous combat 
 
 132. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5)(a); CIHL, supra note 1, r.13; Interestingly, the 
DoD and US Army/Marine Corps manuals do not address this issue, but the 2017 US Navy/Marine 
Corps/Coast Guard manual does include such a prohibition. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. 
COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.8.1.1 (2017). 
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function and thus be targetable as OAG members. 
Should an individual not qualify as a member of an OAG, protection 
from attack would only be lost for such time as he or she directly participates 
in hostilities. Direct participation results when three cumulative constitutive 
elements are satisfied: 1) threshold of harm, 2) direct causation, and 3) 
belligerent nexus. In considering whether the harm caused is direct enough, 
and as with the issue of mixed non-State groups, the level of war to which 
the intelligence contributes is a useful indicator of directness. Belligerent 
nexus is also often a determinative criterion, for many intelligence activities 
are unrelated to the armed conflict, law enforcement being the paradigmatic 
example. 
The targetability of objects used by OAGs or direct participants in 
hostilities to perform intelligence activities is assessed by reference to 
qualification as a military objective. The two-pronged test requires that the 
object contribute to the OAG’s military action and that an attack on the 
object will yield a definite military advantage to the attacker. Almost every 
object used for intelligence purposes related to the conflict may be targeted 
as a military objective, subject to the rule of proportionality and the 
requirement to take precautions in attack. 
In sum, individuals who perform intelligence functions that contribute 
meaningfully to the ability of a non-State group to conduct hostilities are 
subject to lawful attack under IHL. Other individuals who do not do so but 
are members of an intelligence organization that is part of a non-State 
group’s OAG are also targetable. All equipment and other assets used to 
perform intelligence functions that facilitate the conduct of hostilities are 
likewise subject to attack as military objects. 
 
